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10.D2. Discussion 
O.Renn 
10.00.1. Results of and concluslollll fro ... risk perception studies 
In generni people are doing a good Job In assessing the magnitude of a 
risk that Is familiar to them. They underestimate high risks and 
overestimate low risks, but otherwise they are quite aware of the 
threats and dangers which they are exposed to. 
The perceived degree of severity of risks Is aimost Independent of 
the perceived number of expected losses. The disaster potential 
(dread) and the de2l"ee of uncertainty (Individual familiarity and scien-
tific knowledge) are two of the key factors In determining the per-
ceived level of risk. In addition, the perceived justice In the 
risk-benefit distribution, the potentials for Individual and societal 
control of the risk, and volunlarlness of the risky activity Influence 
personal judgment on how society should deal with risks and what regu-
lations are required. 
Social psychological and sociological studies show that judgments 
on risky technologies or activities depend not only on psychological 
factors like the ones mentioned above but also on reference 2l"oup judg-
ments, salient beliefs about the risk source, perception of the pro-
ponents and opponents of the risk source, degree of loyalty toward 
official policymakers, and commitment to social values and culturni 
goals. Since all these factors, including the psychological ones, are 
interrelated and sometimes reflect mere post-rationalizations of 
unconscious feelings and social constraints, it Is very dlfticult to set up 
a reliable model of how people actually perceive risks and evaluate 
them. What we know - and to what degree we know It - Is What 
matters; but analysts are .tUl searching for a theory that can explain 
the process of people's judgment on risks. 
We certainly do know that people make judgments on technologies, 
events, or activities, and not on an abstract notion Ilke risk. There are 
Indications that people assess the potential for threat In a similar way 
and that slmller mechanisms of processing and evaluating information 
about risk are operating under the psychological premises of common 
sense. But the meaning of risk differs not only among individuals: it 
differs also among technologies and activities perceived by one and the 
S8me individual. 
Hence, there Is no universal risk threshold which allows distinc-
tion between accepted and nonaccepted risks. What kind of risks are 
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acceptable or not differs amoni people and risk sources considerably 
and Is almost independent of the actual probabilities of beini affected. 
A compound model of psychological, group-related, and value-oriented 
factors can best predict the individual judgment on the acceptance of 
technologies or ecU vitles . 
10.00.2 . Lessons for riIIk colllll11llicatioll.8 
Risk comparisons usually fail to convince anyone except the profes-
sional risk analyst. Since risk has a different meaning in different con-
texts, comparisons make little sense to the public. Only in cases where 
risk sources have a very similar structure and serve the same purpose 
should comparisons be used in communication. 
Risk communication should not concentrate on conveying probabil-
ities and their meanini to the public. Probabilltles will be intuitively 
learnt by experience (although biased by personal performance) or can 
be indirectly communicated by describing the safety measures taken to 
protect individuals and society. 
Risk communication should focus on the key aspects of risk per-
ception: on the disaster potential, on the management ot uncertaInty, 
on the means of societal control and monitoring. and, of course, on the 
benefits which are given to the society and/or the individual. 
Acceptance of risk sources Is highly influenced by the trust in 
the fairness and rationality of the decision-making procedure and the 
credlbillty of the actors involved. Psychological barriers of perception 
can easily be overcome If those two conditions are met. Unfortunately 
or fortunately - depending on which side one stands - ali tricks and 
recipes tor retaining or gaining trust and credibility usueliy fall in an 
open society with a pluralist value structure and a free press. Trust 
and credibillty are dependent on honesty, transparency, competence, 
and a good past record. 
Risk communication can only be effective if the communication 
process Is structured as a two-way information exchange. Regulators 
can learn something frem the public and vice versa. It Is also essential 
that the communication process allows for alteratlons of the final deci-
sion. Nobody Is motivated to communicate if he cannot change parts ot 
the Issue . 
10.00.3. Lessons tor compensation 
Since there is no universal risk acceptance threshold and people's 
Judgments vary over the severity of risk posed by a technology or 
activity, risk perception studies provide no recipes for determining 
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how much compensation is needed to level off the exposure to a 
specific risk. 
Because of the dllferent marginal utilities of income and variations 
of perceived danger among individuals. compensation on the basis of 
perceived personal loss will inevitably lead to different compensational 
sums being handed out to individuals with respect to the same risk 
taken. Since people demand that risk spreading as well as compensa-
tion should be just. variations in payment will not be accepted. 
Taking the mean value of all revealed demands for compensation 
would probably be rejected by those persons whose compensation was 
lower than originally demanded and would enhance the distrust of those 
who were overpaid ("if they pay me more than I demand. there has to 
be something wrong"). Choosing the upper limit of all reveaied demands 
would exceed any financial limits. 
Compensation might be a viable and acceptable means of risk 
management If it were comprised of better or cheaper access to ser-
vices (e.g. electricity) - disregardinll marginal utillty - or collective 
goods (e.g. improvement of the infrastructure). Although people use 
the community infrastructure in varying degrees. the axiom of per-
ceived justice Is met. since anyone has the same chance of using the 
facility. 
Since the exact amount of compensation cannot be calculated on 
the basis of perceived risk and will run Into acceptance problems If the 
sum is calculated only on the basis of "objective" probabilities. either 
an open bargaining process with representatives of the community 
(which will work best if alternative sites are available and compete for 
this specific risk source) should be initiated or a panel group of 
selected citizens (in particular ones not directly affected by the risk 
source to avoid strategic responses) should determine the amount of 
compensation which they feel just and fair (after being informed about 
the risks involved). 
The above points concerning compensation do not apply if risks 
can be reduced by compensating measures (e.g. rebuilding houses to 
increase protection). 
